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Bankruptcy
by Honorable John T. Laney, III*
and Nicholas J. Garcia"
I. INTRODUCTION

This Article is a review of select bankruptcy opinions issued in 2016
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.' The selected bankruptcy opinions surveyed and summarized by the Authors involve the following bankruptcy topics: Stale Debt Collection, the Dischargeability of Debts, Exemptions, Contempt, Judicial Estoppel, and
the Rules of Procedure. During 2016, the Eleventh Circuit addressed
some "exceptionally important" issues arising in consumer bankruptcy
cases and created a circuit split requiring resolution by the United States
Supreme Court. 2
II. STALE DEBT COLLECTION

In the last three years, the Eleventh Circuit has taken a minority position on an issue that tests the relationship between the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA)3 and section 501(a) of the Bankruptcy

*United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Middle District of Georgia. Mercer University
(A.B., 1964); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude,
1966). Member, Mercer Law Review (1964-1966); Co-Editor in Chief (1965-1966). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
-Law Clerk to the Hon. John T. Laney, III. University of Georgia (A.B.J., cum laude,
2011); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2015). Member,
Mercer Law Review (2013-2015); Editor in Chief (2014-2015). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of bankruptcy and bankruptcy-related opinions issued during the
prior survey period, see Hon. John T. Laney, III & Nicholas J. Garcia, Bankruptcy, Eleventh
Circuit Survey, 67 MERCER L. REv. 819 (2016).
2. Bill Rochelle, Supreme Court to Resolve Circuit Splits on the FairDebt Collection
PracticesAct, AM. BANKR. INST.: ROCHELLE's DAILY WIRE (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.abi.
org/newsroom/daily-wire/supreme-court-to-resolve-circuit-splits-on-the-fair-debt-colletionpractices.
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p (2012).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 169 -1

929

930

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

Code. 4 Under the FDCPA, "debt collectors" 5 are prohibited from using
"unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any
debt."6 Specifically, the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from collecting
any amount of debt unless there is an agreement creating the amount of
debt or the collection of the amount of debt is permitted by law.7 Furthermore, debt collectors violate the FDCPA if their conduct in connection
with collecting a debt is "false, deceptive, or misleading."8 Under § 501(a),
"[a] creditor .... may file a proof of claim" in a bankruptcy case for a debt
owed to it by the debtor. 9 As pointed out by the Eleventh Circuit in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC,1o "[a] deluge has swept through U.S.

[B]ankruptcy courts of late.""' That deluge is caused by the business practice of "Stale Debt Collection." Debt collectors buy unpaid, time-barred
debts 12 for pennies on the dollar and try to collect those debts in bankruptcy court by filing proofs of claim in debtors' bankruptcy cases.' 3 The
idea is that neither the Chapter 13 Trustee nor the debtor will object to
some of these claims due to the claims being time-barred, and these
claims will be allowed and paid out in bankruptcy cases.1 4 Because the
debt collectors purchased the debts for so little, the allowance of just a
few claims makes the business profitable.15 The issue that arises is
whether their filing of proofs of claims to collect stale debts in Chapter
4. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012). All statutory references hereinafter and not otherwise
denoted are to Title 11 of the United States Code, which is referred to as "the Bankruptcy
Code."
5. A debt collector is defined as "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection
of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts
owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another" and "includes any creditor who, in the
process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate
that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
In the context of unfair debt collection practices, the term also "includes any person who
uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal
purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests." Id.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. The statute provides a list of the types of conduct that would
result in violations of the Unfair Practices section of the FDCPA. Id.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a).
10. 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).
11. Id. at 1256.
12. Debt collectors purchase delinquent accounts that are deemed unenforceable under
state statute of limitations. Id.
13. Id. Debt collectors utilize computer systems to notify them to file proofs of claims
when the debtors on the delinquent accounts file for bankruptcy. Rochelle, supra note 2.
14. Rochelle, supra note 2.
15. Id.
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13 bankruptcy cases violates the FDCPA.16 In Crawford, the Eleventh
Circuit answered that question in the affirmative;1 7 however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth, Seventh, Fourth, and Second Circuits have held that filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt does not
violate the FDCPA.1s
In Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC,1 9 the Eleventh Circuit answered a question that the Crawford panel left open: whether § 501
"preempts" the FDCPA so as to preclude an FDCPA claim when creditors
misbehave in bankruptcy by filing proofs of claim for stale debts. 20 The
facts in the two cases considered in Johnson were typical of these debt
collector cases. 21 In the titled case, Midland Funding, LLC (Midland) filed
a proof of claim for $1,879.71 in the debtor's Chapter 13 bankruptcy case
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Alabama. Midland's business practice consisted of purchasing unpaid, overdue debts from creditors. Midland was trying to collect on debts originally owed to Fingerhut Credit Advantage, with the last transaction on
the account occurring over ten years prior to the debtor's filing for bankruptcy. 22 In Alabama, the statute of limitations to collect on an overdue

debt is six years. 23 In the other case considered, Resurgent Capital Services, L.P. (Resurgent) filed a proof of claim for $4,155.40. Resurgent's
business practice was different from Midland's in that Resurgent was a

16. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1256-57.
17. Id. at 1257. The Eleventh Circuit applied the "least sophisticated consumer standard." Id. at 1258. This standard requires the court to determine "whether the 'least sophisticated consumer' would have been deceived by the debt collector's conduct." Id. (quoting
Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1169, 1177 n.11 (11th Cir. 1985)). The Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[the] debt collector's filing of a time-barred proof of claim creates the
misleading impression to the debtor that the debt collector can legally enforce the debt." Id.
at 1261. Therefore, knowingly filing such a proof of claim is conduct that violates the

FDCPA. Id. at 1262.
18. See generally Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 828 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2016);
Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2016); Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions,
LLC (In re Dubois), 834 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2016); Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622
F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
19. 823 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 326 (2016).
20. Id. at 1338.
21. In this opinion, the Eleventh Circuit consolidated the appeals of Johnson v. Mid-

land Funding, LLC, 528 B.R. 462 (S.D. Ala. 2015) and Brock v. Resurgent Capital Services,
LP, No. 14-0324-WS-M, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109911 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 20, 2015). Johnson,
823 F.3d at 1337.
22. Johnson, 823 F.3d at 1336.
23. Id.
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"manager and servicer" of consumer debt portfolios who attempted to collect debts on behalf of "credit[or] grantors and debt buyers." 24 In this case,
Resurgent attempted to collect a debt on behalf of LVNV Funding, LLC
who, like Midland, is a purchaser of unpaid debts. The debt originated
with Washington Mutual Bank, N.A., and the last transaction on the account occurred over six years prior to the debtor filing for Chapter 13
relief. 25 The debtors each brought an FDCPA claim against their respec-

tive debt collectors, alleging that the claims were barred by the statute
of limitations and thus were "unfair, unconscionable, deceptive, and misleading." 26
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
ruled in favor of the debt collectors. 27 The court determined that the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Crawford put the Bankruptcy Code and the
FDCPA in "irreconcilable conflict" because § 501 allows creditors to file
proofs of claim for time-barred debts if a creditor has a "right to payment"
under applicable state law while the FDCPA prohibits such conduct. 28
Applying the doctrine of implied repeal, 29 the district court held that the
debt collectors' rights to file proofs of claims for time-barred debts under
§ 501 precluded debtors from suing debt collectors under the FDCPA for
such conduct in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases.30
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and held that "[t]he
Bankruptcy Code does not preclude an FDCPA claim in the context of a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy when a debt collector files a proof of claim it
knows to be time-barred." 31 The court focused on the applicability of the
FDCPA in reaching its conclusion. 32 It is true that the language of § 501
allows all creditors to file proofs of claims on time-barred debts. 33 Additionally, the fact that the claims are unenforceable because of states'
statutes of limitations does not prevent claimants from asserting such

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1336-37.
27. Id. at 1337.
28. Id. at 1336-37.
29. Where there is an irreconcilable conflict between two federal statutes, "the later
act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one." Id. at 1340
(quoting Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)). The district court
resolved what it found to be an "obvious tension" between the Bankruptcy Code and the
FDCPA by concluding that the later-enacted Bankruptcy Code provision impliedly repealed
the earlier enacted FDCPA. Id. at 1339.
30. Id. at 1337.
31. Id. at 1338.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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claims. 34 However, the right to file claims for time-barred debts does not
protect the claimants "from all consequences of filing these claims." 35 The
court noted that debt collectors are a particular type of creditor susceptible to civil liability under the FDCPA for certain conduct exhibited while
attempting to collect debts. 36 The FDCPA does not apply to all creditors
filing claims under § 501.37 The debt collector must knowingly file the
time-barred claim for the debt collector to be liable for a FDCPA violation.38 Therefore, the FDCPA has "a narrow range of actors and claims"
to which it applies.39
The Eleventh Circuit also addressed the district court's application of
the doctrine of implied repeal. 40 The court determined that the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA were not in irreconcilable conflict as to warrant the later-enacted Bankruptcy Code impliedly repealing the earlierenacted FDCPA.41 The court noted that irreconcilable conflict is present
where there is "positive repugnancy" between the two statutes "because
two statutes can typically coexist if they simply contain'different requirements and protections."' 42 For the court to infer statutory repeal, the later
statute must expressly contradict the earlier statute, or the implied repeal of the earlier statute must be absolutely necessary to give the later
enacted statute any effect.4 3 The Eleventh Circuit determined that there
was no such positive repugnancy between § 501 and the FDCPA.44 It rea-

34. Id. at 1338-39.
35. Id. at 1339.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that "the FDCPA provides a safe harbor for
debt collectors who might unintentionally or in good faith file such a claim." Id. A debt
collector defending an FDCPA can successfully do so by showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that their conduct "was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error." Id.
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2012)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1340.
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144
(2001)). The Eleventh Circuit noted that "repeals by implication are not favored and will
not be presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal is clear and manifest." Id.
(quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662 (2007)).
43. Id.
44. Id. The court noted that two facts "bolstered" its conclusion that there was no positive repugnancy between the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA: (1) neither statute has a
provision governing the interaction between the statutes at issue in these debt collector
cases; and (2) Congress did not intend to repeal the protections of the FDCPA when it enacted the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1341-42.

934

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

soned that the statutes could coexist because they differ in purpose, provide different protections, and reach different actors.4 5 A creditor may file
a proof of claim under the Bankruptcy Code. 46 However, if the claimantcreditor is a debt collector and the claim is for a time-barred debt, they
are susceptible to liability under the FDCPA.47 With no irreconcilable
conflict between the statutes, the debtors' FDCPA claims were not precluded by the Bankruptcy Code, and their cases were remanded to the
district court. 48
In Nelson v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. ,49 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the FDCPA is not violated by a debt collector's filing of a proof of claim on a time-barred debt.50
The debtor argued that the Eighth Circuit should follow the Eleventh
Circuit to extend the FDCPA to proofs of claims filed in bankruptcy
cases.5 1 The court rejected such an extension of the FDCPA.52 The court
reasoned that the Eleventh Circuit "ignore[dj the differences between a
bankruptcy claim and actual or threatened litigation." 53 The FDCPA protects the unsophisticated debtor from being harassed, misled, or deceived
by the debt collector.54 Such protections are necessary to protect a
non-bankruptcy debtor in a collection lawsuit. However, such protections
are not necessary for the bankruptcy debtor "aided by 'trustees who owe
fiduciary duties to all parties and have a statutory obligation to object to

45. Id. at 1340. 'The Code allows all 'creditors' to file proofs of claim while the FDCPA
dictates the behavior of only 'debt collectors' both within and outside of bankruptcy. The
Code establishes the ability to file a proof of claim while the FDCPA addresses the later
ramifications of filing a claim." Id. (citations omitted). "[Tihese regimes together provid[e]
different tiers of sanctions for creditor misbehavior in bankruptcy." Id. at 1341 (citations
omitted).
46. Id. at 1342.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 828 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2016).
50. Id. at 752.
51. Id. Specifically, the debtor argued to extend the rule prohibiting "a debt collector
from filing or threatening a lawsuit to collect a time-barred debt" to include a claim filed in
a bankruptcy case. Id. at 751. The basis of this rule is the Eighth Circuit's decision in Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc., which held that "in the absence of a threat of litigation or actual litigation, no violation of the FDCPA has occurred when a debt collector attempts to collect on a potentially time-barred debt that is otherwise valid." 248 F.3d 767,
771 (8th Cir. 2001).
52. Nelson, 828 F.3d at 752.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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unenforceable claims."' 5 5 The bankruptcy process itself protects bank-

'

ruptcy debtors.56
In Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions LLC (In re Dubois),57 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a creditor does not violate the FDCPA by filing a proof of claim on time-barred debt when the
statute of limitations does not extinguish the debt.58 Similar to the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee to object to such a claim.5 9 The court
stated that it "appreciate[d] the harm that [could] be wrought if timebarred claims go unnoticed" by the trustee or the debtor.6 0 However, the
Fourth Circuit did not believe the solution was to impose FDCPA liability
"that would categorically bar the filing of such claims." 6
In Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC,62 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that "a proof of claim on a time-barred
debt does not purport to be anything other than a claim subject to dispute
in the bankruptcy case," and "[fliling such a proof of claim is not inherently misleading or deceptive." 63 The Seventh Circuit recognized its split,
as well as the Eighth Circuit's split, with the Eleventh Circuit.6 4 Like the
Eighth Circuit,6 5 the Seventh Circuit noted that the concerns of "misleading [and] deceptive" conduct by debt collectors "are less acute when a
proof of ,claim is filed in bankruptcy . . . as opposed to when a lawsuit is
filed in state or federal court."6 6 Furthermore, Seventh Circuit precedent

55. Id. (quoting Gatewood v. CP Med., LLC (In re Gatewood), 533 B.R. 905, 909 (B.A.P.
8th Cir. 2015)).
56. Id. The Eighth Circuit noted that the bankruptcy process's "protections against
harassment and deception satisfy the relevant concerns of the FDCPA." Id.
57. 834 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2016).
58. Id. at 533. Like the Eleventh Circuit in Crawford, the Fourth Circuit avoided answering the question of whether the Bankruptcy Code precluded the FDCPA. Id. at 533
n.11.
59. Id. at 531.
60. Id. The Fourth Circuit opined that the solution to prevent claims on stale debts
from being paid out in bankruptcy cases is "to improve the Code's administration such that
it operates as written." Id. The court suggests allocating additional resources to trustees or
for the U.S. Trustee to determine and implement a resolution. Id.
61. Id.
62. 832 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2016).
63. Id. at 734.
64. Id.
65. Nelson, 828 F.3d at 749.
66. Owens, 832 F.3d at 735. The dissent criticized the majority's assertion that the
bankruptcy process protects its debtors. Id. at 740 (Wood, J., dissenting). It reasons that
pro se debtors are unsophisticated consumers that could "easily be buffaloed into thinking
that every proof of claim represented a legal obligation." Id.
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mandated a different approach to FDCPA violations in the bankruptcy
context than Eleventh Circuit precedent.67
The United States Supreme Court recognized the need to resolve this
circuit split and granted certiorari on October 11, 2016, in Midland
Funding, LLC v. Johnson.68 On May 15, 2017, the Court reversed the
Eleventh Circuit.6 9 The Court's decision essentially saved the Stale Debt
Collection Industry and allows stale debt collectors to continue to participate in bankruptcy proceedings without fear of FDCPA liability.
III. DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS

A. Tax Debt
Under the Bankruptcy Code, an individual debtor may not discharge
certain tax debts. 70 Section 523(a)(1)(B) 71 provides that a debt is non-dischargeable if it is for a tax for which a return was not filed, or if it is for
a tax for which the return was filed late and within two years before the
date the debtor filed a petition. 72 In Justice v. United States (In re Justice),73 the Eleventh Circuit determined that late-filed Forms 1040 do not
constitute "returns" under § 523(a). 74 The debtor, Justice, filed Forms
1040 for the tax years 2000 through 2003. After being notified by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of his tax debts, Justice prepared Forms
1040 in 2007 for the four tax years 2000-2003. Justice filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy in 2011. It was undisputed that Justice filed his purported
tax returns late but before the two years prior to his filing a bankruptcy

67. Id. at 736. In Evory v. RJMAcquisitions Funding, LLC, the Seventh Circuit held
that the "competent attorney standard" rather than the unsophisticated consumer standard governed when the alleged violation of the FDCPA was the making of deceptive or misleading representations, or committing other abusive, deceptive or unconscionable acts in
connection with debt collection through communications with lawyers. 505 F.3d 769 (7th
Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit applied this standard in Owens because the debtors were
represented by counsel. 832 F.3d at 736. In further support of its application of such a
standard, the Seventh Circuit notes that the bankruptcy process affords the protection of
the trustee. Id. In Crawford, the debtors were also represented by counsel but the Eleventh
Circuit applied the least sophisticated consumer standard. 758 F.3d at 1258.
68. 137 S. Ct. 326 (2016).
69. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017). This decision is outside
the survey period for this Article. Therefore, it will be analyzed in next year's Eleventh
Circuit Survey.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2012).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
73. 817 F.3d 738 (11th Cir. 2016).
74. Id. at 746-47.
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petition. 75 Therefore, if Justice's Forms 1040 were in fact returns, then
the tax debt for those years would be dischargeable because
§ 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) would not apply.7 6 However, if the forms were not in fact
returns, then "Justice [would be] deemed never to have filed 'returns"'
77
and the tax debts would be non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(1)(B)(i).
The Eleventh Circuit applied the test from Beard v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue78 to determine whether the debtor's Forms 1040 qualified as tax returns. Under the Beard test, a document must meet the following requirements to serve as a tax return: "(1) it must purport to be a
return; (2) it must be executed under penalty of perjury; (3) it must contain sufficient data to allow calculation of tax; and (4) it must represent
an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax
law."7 9 Only the fourth prong of the Beard test was at issue here, and
therefore, the Eleventh Circuit had to determine whether the Forms 1040
filed by Justice "represented an honest and reasonable effort to comply
with the tax law."8 0 The court held that the forms failed to meet that
prong.81
As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have held "that delinquency in filing is relevant
to" the fourth Beard factor. 82 The Eleventh Circuit also addressed the
"one-day-late rule" of the First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals.8 3 The one-day-late rule applies the definition of a return in the
"hanging paragraph" at the bottom of § 523.85 Under that rule, a late-

75. Id. at 741-42.
76. Id. at 742.
77. Id.
78. 793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986).
79. In re Justice, 817 F.3d at 740-41.
80. Id. at 741.
81. Id. at 746.
82. Id. at 741 (citing In re Payne, 431 F.3d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 2005); Moroney v.
United States (In re Moroney), 352 F.3d 902, 906 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hindenlang (In re Hindenlang), 164 F.3d 1029, 1034-35 (6th Cir. 1999)).
83. Id. at 743 (citing Mallo v. IRS (In re Mallo), 774 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2014); McCoy
v. Miss. State Tax Comm'n (In re McCoy), 666 F.3d 924, 932 (5th Cir. 2012)).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2016). The hanging paragraph states
For purposes of this subsection, the term "return" means a return that satisfies
the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing
requirements). Such term includes a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or similar State or local law,
or a written stipulation to a judgment or a final order entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return made pursuant to section 6020(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or a similar State or local law.
11 U.S.C. § 523.
85. In re Justice, 817 F.3d at 742 n.4.
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filed tax document purporting to be a tax return does not comply with the
"applicable filing requirements."8 6 Therefore, the document cannot be a
return under § 523(a). 87 However, the Eleventh Circuit "assume[d] arguendo that the applicable filing requirements Congress envisioned in
the hanging paragraph do not include filing deadlines," and that the "oneday-late rule [was] incorrect."88
Although the Eleventh Circuit did not adopt the strict one-day-late
rule, it sided with the majority of courts and held that the fourth prong
of the Beard test "requires analysis of the entire time frame relevant to
the taxpayer's actions."8 9 The court reasoned that filing a purported tax
return late, at least without a justification for its tardiness, shows "the
lack of a reasonable effort to comply with the [tax] law." 90 The court explained that this rationale is consistent with the purpose of bankruptcy,
which is to "provide a 'fresh start' to the 'honest but unfortunate
debtor."'9 1
The court's holding is also consistent with the United States tax system. 92 The court noted that our tax system "relies on prompt and honest
self-reporting by taxpayers."98 Neglect in timely filing tax returns or submitting information to the IRS "frustrates the requirements and objectives of that system."94 Furthermore, recognizing the duty to file tax returns only upon notice of delinquencies by the IRS in filing frustrates the
system.95 Based on this reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit determined that
"[d]elinquency in filing ... is evidence that the taxpayer failed to make a
reasonable effort to comply with the law."9 6

Because Justice's Forms 1040 were late-filed, they did not represent
an honest and reasonable attempt by Justice to comply with the tax
law.97 Therefore, the forms did not constitute a return under the Beard

86. Id. at 743 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523).
87. Id.
88. Id. The Eleventh Circuit assumed arguendo that the one-day-late rule was wrong
because it determined that Justice's tax debts were non-dischargeable on other grounds.

Id.
89. Id. at 744.
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting United States v. Mitchell (In re Mitchell), 633 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2011)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 746.
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test.98 Consequently, Justice failed to file tax returns for tax debts for
years 2000 through 2003, and the debts were, thus, non-dischargeable

under

§ 523(a)(1)(B)(i). 99
IV. EXEMPTIONS
00

Last year's article'
discussed Mooney v. Webster (In re Mooney),1 0 a
case from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The district court affirmed the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Middle District of Georgia's decision,1 02 which held the debtor could
not claim a health savings account (HSA) as exempt property under sec-

tions 44-13-100(a)(2)(C)

103

and (a)(2)(E)1 04 of the Official Code of Georgia

Annotated (O.C.G.A.) because the HSA was not intended as a substitute
for wages. 0 5 The debtors appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit.106
During the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit certified three questions to the Georgia Supreme Court:
(1) Does a debtor's health savings account constitute a right to receive
a "disability, illness, or unemployment benefit" for the purposes of
O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(C)?
(2) Does a debtor's health savings account constitute a right to receive
a "payment under a pension, annuity, or similar plan or contract" for
the purposes of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E)?

98. Id.
99. Id. at 746-47.
100. See Laney & Garcia, supranote 1, at 826-27 for further analysis of the district court
decision in Mooney v. Webster (In re Mooney), No. 1:14-CV-54(WLS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22964 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2015). See also Hon. John T. Laney, III & Daniel Taylor, Bankruptcy, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 66 MERCER L. REV. 881, 888-89 (2015) for further analysis
of the bankruptcy court decision in In re Mooney.
101. No. 1:14-CV-54(WLS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22964 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2015).
102. In re Mooney, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22964, at *1.
103. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(C) (2002 & Supp. 2016). This subsection allows bankruptcy debtors to exempt their rights to receive disability, illness, or unemployment benefits. Id.
104. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E) (2002 & Supp. 2016). This subsection allows bankruptcy debtors to exempt their rights to receive payments under a "pension, annuity, or
similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to
the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor." Id.
105. In re Mooney, 503 B.R. 916, 922 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2014).
106. Mooney v. Webster (In re Mooney), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22964, appeal docketed
No. 15-11229 (11th Cir. Mar. 24, 2015).
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(3) Is a debtor's right to receive a payment from a health savings account "on account of illness [or] disability" for the purposes of O.C.G.A.
§ 44-13-100(a)(2)(E)? 107
The Georgia Supreme Court answered the first two questions in the
negative, rendering the third unnecessary.10 8 The court began its discussion of the questions by noting that the Georgia Exemption StatuteO.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)10 9-does not expressly provide an exemption for
HSAs.110 In answering the first question, the court considered "whether
[an] HSA is a 'benefit' in regard to 'illness."'11 1 Similar to the bankruptcy
court, the Georgia Supreme Court looked to the Webster's Dictionary definitions of "benefit" and "illness" to determine that HSAs are not illness
benefits because HSAs may also be used for medical expenses not associated with the beneficiary actually being ill.112 The court concluded that
HSAs have a "broader purpose" than the benefits Congress intended for
bankruptcy debtors to claim as exempt under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-

100(a)(2)(C).

113

In answering the second question, the Georgia Supreme Court noted
that it had previously interpreted O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E) and its
applicability to a single-premium fixed annuity. 114 In Silliman v. Cassell,115 the Georgia Supreme Court determined that an annuity qualifies
for the exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E) if it "provides income as a substitute for wages." 116 Based on its holding in Cassell, the
Georgia Supreme Court concluded that an HSA, when used for its appropriate purpose, was not intended to be a substitute for wages.1 17 Rather,

107. Mooney v. Webster (In re Mooney), 812 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2016).
108. Mooney v. Webster, 300 Ga. 283, 284, 794 S.E.2d 31, 32 (2016).
109. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a) (2002 & Supp. 2016).
110. Mooney, 300 Ga. at 288, 794 S.E.2d at 34-35.
111. Id. at 289, 794 S.E.2d at 35.
112. Id. at 289-90, 794 S.E.2d at 35-36. The court noted that HSAs may also be used for
'"diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body,' which are uses not dependent on the beneficiary being ill." Id. at 290, 794 S.E.2d at 36 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2012)).
113. Id. at 290, 794 S.E.2d at 36.
114. Id.
115. 292 Ga. 464, 738 S.E.2d 606 (2013).
116. Id. at 468, 738 S.E.2d at 610. In Silliman, the Georgia Supreme Court relied on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 (2005), which
determined that the debtors' IRAs were exempt due to the IRAs being similar to the enumerated exempt plans under the Federal Exemptions provided in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E).
Silliman, 292 Ga. at 469, 738 S.E.2d at 611.
117. Mooney, 300 Ga. at 290, 794 S.E.2d at 36.
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8
an HSA is merely a place to park wages.11 Therefore, an HSA may not
be claimed as exempt property by bankruptcy debtors under the Georgia
Exemptions Statute.119

V. CONTEMPT

A. Civil Contempt
120
In Gowdy v. Mitchell (In re Ocean Warrior, Inc.), the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the bankruptcy court's authority to hold parties liable for
civil contempt. The contemptuous activity found by the bankruptcy court
involved a commercial shrimping vessel called the "F/V Janice" and a
national fugitive. In 1989, Mitchell filed two claims in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington relating to an injury suffered aboard the F/V Janice: (1) a claim against Ocean Warrior,
Inc. (Ocean Warrior) and another Florida corporation for failing to provide post-injury remedies after he was hurt; and (2) an in rem maritime
claim against the F/V Janice, listing Ocean Warrior as the owner. The
Washington district court had the vessel arrested in admiralty. Two
years later, the F/V Janice was sold in an in rem sale per court order. 121
However, the sale was voided by Ocean Warrior's filing for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida on the same day. The bankruptcy court ordered that
Gowdy, the president of Ocean Warrior, be allowed to continue to use the
vessel because there was equity in the vessel over the amount Mitchell
claimed in his lawsuit. Gowdy's continued use of the boat was contingent
on Gowdy's maintaining insurance on the vessel and its remaining in
U.S. waters off the coast of Washington pending Mitchell's maritime
claim. Almost two years after Ocean Warrior filed for bankruptcy, the
Washington district court entered a judgment on the maritime claim.
Based on that judgment, Ocean Warrior was to deposit $38,000 into the
Florida bankruptcy court's registry as security for Mitchell. However,
Ocean Warrior made no such deposit. Furthermore, both the F/V Janice
and Gowdy had disappeared sometime in August 1992. Both the Florida
Bankruptcy court and the Washington district court issued warrants for
Gowdy's arrest. With the F/V Janice missing, Ocean Warrior could not
complete a reorganization under Chapter 11, and the bankruptcy court
converted its case to a Chapter 7. The case was eventually closed in 1999,
but the bankruptcy court "retain[ed] jurisdiction to reopen this case in

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
835 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1313.
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the event the Vessel F/V Janice and/or Mr. James Gowdy are located"
and mandated that "[a]ll existing Orders shall remain in full force and
effect."1 22
Twenty years after Gowdy's disappearance, U.S. Marshalls arrested
him in Texas. He explained that the F/V Janice had been stolen by Colombians, but he had then recovered the vessel only to lose it again to
lienholders. The Washington district court released Gowdy and deferred
to the Florida bankruptcy court's civil contempt proceedings. 123
In December 2011, Gowdy appeared pro se at a "show cause" hearing.
Finding Gowdy in civil contempt, the court ordered him to produce the
vessel or pay Mitchell's judgment. He had ninety days to purge his contempt before other sanctions, such as incarceration, were considered. In
June 2012, Gowdy filed an affidavit stating he had no assets to pay the
filing fees to appeal the court's contempt order. However, the affidavit
did not include a personal injury suit he initiated in Texas that later settled for $449,637.22, nor did it include the true value of his interest in a
Texas home. The Chapter 7 Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding
"seeking recovery for the conversion of the F/V Janice, turnover of the
F/V Janice, and injunctive relief relating to the settlement funds due to
Gowdy."1 24
In March 2014, the bankruptcy court entered an order covering the
following: (1) the imposition of sanctions on Gowdy for his failure to purge
his civil contempt; (2) the approval of the disbursement of funds to Mitchell for his now nearly twelve-year-old judgment; and (3) the authorization
of the entry of a final judgment against Gowdy and in favor of the Trustee. 125 On appeal, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment. 126
First, the Eleventh Circuit disposed of Gowdy's argument that "the
bankruptcy court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on disputed issues of fact regarding his civil contempt." 127
The show cause hearing provided Gowdy an opportunity to testify as to
the civil contempt allegations against him. 128 However, he failed to provide any evidence to refute the allegations.1 29 Gowdy received adequate

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1313-14.
at 1314.
at 1314-15.
at 1315. The court amended its final judgment in the amount of $239,143.14.

Id.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1315-16.
Id. at 1316.
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notice of the allegations, and the show cause hearing satisfied due process requirements.13 0 Therefore, "the bankruptcy court did not err in
holding an evidentiary show-cause hearing."1 31
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the bankruptcy court had the
authority to punish Gowdy for contempt.1 32 The court noted that "[c]ivil
contempt power is inherent in bankruptcy courts since all courts have
authority to enforce compliance with their lawful orders."13 3 Additionally,
§ 105134 grants bankruptcy courts statutory civil contempt powers.1 35 The
court reasoned that the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction
to hold Gowdy liable for civil contempt.1 36 Gowdy failed to comply with
numerous bankruptcy orders, including the one requiring him to purge
himself of civil contempt.1 37 After his failure to do so, the bankruptcy
court imposed sanctions.1 38 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the sanctions
were not punitive, as Gowdy had alleged.1 39 Therefore, "the bankruptcy
court did not err by imposing coercive and compensatory civil contempt
sanctions" against Gowdy.1 40 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
allegations of civil contempt and the authority to enter a final order.141 It
noted that core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)14 2 include "matters concerning the administration of the estate"' and 'orders to turn

130. Id. Gowdy also argued that the bankruptcy court violated his due process rights by
threatening him with incarceration for contempt. Id. Furthermore, he contended his rights

were violated because he was not represented by counsel at the hearing. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit determined that the following statement by the bankruptcy court at the show cause
hearing proved that the bankruptcy court did not violate Gowdy's rights: "[We're not going
to incarcerate you .... This is a civil contempt motion here notwithstanding that you were
arrested on the criminal contempt motion. . . ." Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1317.
133. Id. at 1316 (quoting Alderwoods Grp., Inc. v. Garcia, 682 F.3d 958, 967 n.18 (11th
Cir. 2012)).
134. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012).
135. In re Ocean Warrior, Inc., 835 F.3d at 1316.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 1317.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1318.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (2012).
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over property of the estate."1 43 Because the bankruptcy court's orders involved the turnover of property of the estate, the F/VJanice, the matter
was a core proceeding.144
B. Contempt of Confirmation Order
The moment a debtor files for bankruptcy, § 362145 imposes an automatic stay, applicable to all entities, against "any act to collect, assess, or
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement
of the case."1 46 However, one exception to the automatic stay applies to
Domestic Support Obligations (DSOs) and states that the automatic stay
does not operate as a stay to "the withholding of income that is property
of the estate or property of the debtor for payment of a domestic support
obligation under a judicial or administrative order or a statute." 147 Under
§ 1327(a), 148 "[t]he provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and
each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by
the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted,
or has rejected the plan."14 9 In State of FloridaDepartment of Revenue v.
Gonzalez (In re Gonzalez),150 the Eleventh Circuit faced the following issue involving the "interplay" between §§ 362 and 1327: whether the DSO
exception to the automatic stay applies after the bankruptcy court has
entered an order confirming the debtor's Chapter 13 plan. 15 1
The debtor in this case filed a Chapter 13 petition, and the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida confirmed
his Chapter 13 plan. 152 After confirmation, the State of Florida Department of Revenue (DOR) filed a proof of claim for arrearages related to a
DSO. The debtor then amended his plan to include full payment of the
arrearages and direct payment of the existing DSO to the DSO obligee.
The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan as amended. After confirmation
of the amended plan, the debtor received notice that the DOR requested
his federal employee travel reimbursement be withheld to pay the DSO.
The debtor filed a motion seeking to hold the DOR in contempt for its

143. In re Ocean Warrior, Inc., 835 F.3d at 1317 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E)).

144. Id. at 1317-18.
145. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
146. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).
147. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(C).
148. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (2012).
149. Id.

150. 832 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2016).
151. Id. at 1253.
152. Id. at 1252.
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153
The bankruptcy court found
attempt to intercept his reimbursement.
that the DOR violated the confirmed plan and held the DOR in contempt. 154 The bankruptcy court also awarded the debtor attorney fees.
15 5
The district court affirmed in both respects.
The DOR argued that it was evident from the legislative history and
the plain language of § 362(b)(2)(C) that "Congress intended for DSO col156
lection efforts to continue unhindered by the confirmation of a plan."
157
Furthermore, the DOR contended that the Congressional Record
shows that Congress meant to fix the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of
DSOs by amendment. 15 8 The debtor made two arguments: (1) if Congress
meant to exclude DSO collection efforts from the binding effect of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan, it could have explicitly done so in the language
of § 1327; and (2) Congress did not intend to exempt the collection of
DSOs from the binding effect of a confirmed plan, especially when the
confirmed plan provides for the full payment of the DSO, because "allowing such a preposterous framework would doom every Chapter 13 case
that involves a DSO creditor."15 9 The Eleventh Circuit determined that
the legislative history of § 362(b)(2)(C) "lacks any suggestion that Congress intended the exception to abrogate the binding effect of
§ 1327(a)."160 Therefore, the plan's silence as to whether the DOR could
intercept the debtor's travel reimbursement prohibited the DOR from
taking such action. 16 1 Thus, the DOR's efforts to intercept the reimbursement amounted to contemptuous behavior in violation of the bankruptcy
court's confirmation order.162

153. Id.
154. Id. at 1253.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1254.
157. The Congressional Record states the following:
"[Ulnder former law the automatic stay did not apply to the collection of support
so long as it was collected from property which was not property of the bankruptcy estate. Since property of the estate included debtor's income in Chapter
12 and 13 cases, at least until confirmation of the plan, a support creditor had
no way of obtaining either on-going support or prepetition support arrearages,
unless the obligor/debtor paid these debts voluntarily or the creditor obtained
relief from the stay. These amendments deal with both issues."
Id. at 1255 (quoting 146 CONG. REc. S11683-02 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2000) (statement by Sen.
Grassley)).
158. Id. at 1254-55.
159. Id. at 1255.
160. Id. at 1258.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1258-59.
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VI. JUDIcIAL ESTOPPEL
In Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 63 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of judicial estoppel, and followed prior precedent to affirm a decision
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
to dismiss a Chapter 7 debtor's discrimination action. In this case, the
plaintiff-employee, Slater, sued her employer, U.S. Steel Corp. (U.S.
Steel) for alleged sex and race discrimination. Nearly two years after initiating the action, Slater filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief. Slater did
not list the lawsuit in her petition.164 When U.S. Steel discovered that
Slater neglected to disclose the employment-discrimination action pending in district court, it filed a motion to dismiss the case 6 5 or for summary
judgment in district court. 166 U.S. Steel argued that Slater lacked standing to prosecute the case.1 67 Relying on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.,1 68 U.S. Steel contended that the doctrine
of judicial estoppel warranted the court's granting of summary judgment. 16 9 After U.S. Steel filed its motion, Slater amended her bankruptcy
petition to disclose the lawsuit. She filed an affidavit in district court testifying that her failure to include the lawsuit in her bankruptcy schedules
was not intentional, and the failure had been cured by amending her answers in her bankruptcy schedules.1 70 Slater made three arguments for
why judicial estoppel should not be invoked: (1) it was inappropriate under the United States Supreme Court's decision in New Hampshire v.
Maine171 because she had created "no risk of inconsistent court determinations" between the bankruptcy court and district court "that could pose

163. 820 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
164. Id. at 1196 n.2. Slater did not mention in her Statement of Financial Affairs that
she was a party in a lawsuit within one year prior to filing her bankruptcy petition, nor did
she list her interest in the lawsuit in her Schedule B, which is the part of a debtor's bankruptcy schedules requiring the debtor to list all her interests in personal property. Id. at
1196.
165. Id. at 1196-97, 1198. The district court ruled on U.S. Steel's motion for summary
judgment because the motion to dismiss became moot during the pendency of the two motions due to the conversion of Slater's Chapter 7 case to a Chapter 13. Id. at 1198. As the
court points out, "[a] Chapter 13 debtor has standing to prosecute a claim of the bankruptcy
estate as the debtor in possession." Id.
166. Id. at 1196-97.
167. Id. at 1197.
168. 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
169. Slater, 820 F.3d at 1197.
170. Id.
171. 532 U.S. 742 (2001). The Supreme Court determined that the following factors "typically inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case:" (1) "a party's
later position must be 'clearly inconsistent' with its earlier position"; (2) "whether the party
has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's earlier position, so that judicial

2017]

BANKRUPTCY

947

a 'threat to judicial integrity'; (2) she would not gain an unfair advantage
or impose an unfair detriment on U.S. Steel; and (3) the doctrine requires
that she "acted intentionally, not inadvertently," and her failure to disclose the lawsuit was inadvertent.1 72
The district court determined that Burnes and Robinson v. Tyson
Foods, Inc.173 controlled in this case and granted summary judgment for
U.S. Steel. 174 In Burnes, the Eleventh Circuit articulated the following
test for application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel:
In the Eleventh Circuit, courts consider two factors in the application
of judicial estoppel to a particular case. 'First, it must be shown that
the allegedly inconsistent positions were made under oath in a prior
proceeding. Second, such inconsistencies must be shown to have been
calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system.' 175
In Robinson, the Eleventh Circuit determined that a party's intent "is
'inadvertent' only when, in general the debtor either lacks knowledge of
the undisclosed claims or has no motive for their concealment." 7 6 The
facts of the Burnes and Robinson cases were similar to that of Slater.177
With Eleventh Circuit precedent controlling, the district court held that
U.S. Steel established both factors under the Burnes test.178 Furthermore, the district court rejected Slater's argument because it believed the
Burnes test incorporated the factors enumerated in New Hampshire.7 9
In affirming the district court's ruling, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated
"[t]he factors that trigger the application" of judicial estoppel: "(1) an inconsistent position taken under oath in the Bankruptcy Court, and (2)
acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create 'the perception
that either the first or the second court was misled"'; and (3) "whether the party seeking to
assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped." Id. at 750-51.
172. Slater, 820 F.3d at 1197.
173. 595 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2010).
174. Slater, 820 F.3d at 1198.
175. Id. (quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285).
176. Id. at 1206 n.19 (quoting Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1275) (internal quotations omitted).
177. Id. at 1198. The district court pointed out that both the Burnes and Robinson cases
involved a plaintiff-employee who failed to disclose a federal employment discrimination
action in his bankruptcy petition. Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. CV-09-BE-1732-S, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136919, at *12-13 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 25, 2012). Therefore, each plaintiff took
an inconsistent position under oath. Id. In both cases, the Eleventh Circuit determined that
"the district court, in its discretion, could infer from the record the requisite intent to make
a mockery of the judicial system; and thus, that the court's application of the doctrine of
judicial estoppel to grant summary judgment was not clear error." Id.
178. Slater, 820 F.3d at 1198.
179. Id.
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advancing an inconsistent position in the [district court] with the intent
to make a mockery of justice."1o The court analyzed Barger v. City of
18 1
Cartersville
to note that the failure to list a lawsuit in a bankruptcy
petition could never be inadvertent because the debtor obviously has
knowledge of the lawsuit.182 Furthermore, the fact that the debtor could
keep the proceeds of the litigation rather than such proceeds becoming
part of her bankruptcy estate establishes motive. 183
In a lengthy special concurrence, Judge Tjoflat stated that the Eleventh Circuit precedent followed by the Slater majority-the Burnes and
Bargercases-"[were] wrongly decided" and noted that "U.S. Steel [was]
granted a windfall, Slater's creditors [were] deprived of an asset, and the
Bankruptcy Court [was] stripped of its discretion." 184 He also provided "a
meticulous analysis and presentation of the genesis of judicial estoppel
in the Eleventh Circuit." 185 Before engaging in a lengthy analysis, Judge
Tjoflat concluded that the Eleventh Circuit should review the case en
banc "to set straight the doctrine of judicial estoppel."18 6 The Eleventh
Circuit answered his request and the opinion was vacated on August 30,
2016, to be reheard en banc. 187
VII. RULES OF PROCEDURE

In Rosenberg v. DVIReceivables XIV, LLC,188 the issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether a federal district court must follow the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.) or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure (F.R.B.P.) when trying a bankruptcy case and addressing a
motion for judgment as a matter of law. 189 In this case, Rosenberg's creditors, the "DVI Entities," filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against her. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Florida later dismissed the involuntary Chapter 7 petition because DVI Entities were not eligible creditors under § 303190 and they

180. Id. at 1210.
181. 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
182. Slater, 820 F.3d at 1208.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1210 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
185. Jeremy Retherford et al., Litigator'sPerspective: 11th Circuit Addresses Judicial
Estoppel, Unscheduled Litigation, 35 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 70 (2016).
186. Slater, 820 F.3d at 1212.
187. Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 12-15548, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16090 (11th Cir.
Aug. 30, 2016).
188. 818 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2016).
189. Id. at 1285.
190. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012).
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were barred from pursuing the case under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 191 Rosenberg initiated an adversary proceeding against DVI Entities
under § 303(i)192 for attorney fees associated with defending the involuntary petition, compensatory and punitive damages for the bad-faith filing, and attorney fees and costs associated with the adversary proceeding. 193 Rosenberg made a demand for a jury. Rather than consent to a
jury trial in bankruptcy court, DVI Entities requested that the district
court remove the reference of the adversary proceeding from the bankruptcy court. The district court granted the motion and tried the case
before a jury.1 94 The jury determined that DVI Entities had acted in bad
faith and returned a verdict of $1.12 million for compensatory damages
and $5 million for punitive damages. The district court then entered a
final judgment on the adversary proceeding. 195
Twenty-eight days later, DVI Entities moved pursuant to
F.R.C.P. 50(b)1 96 for judgment as a matter of law. 197 The motion was
timely under F.R.C.P. 50(b) because it was filed within twenty-eight days
of the final judgment.1 98 However, it was not timely under
F.R.B.P. 9015(c)199 because such motions must be filed within fourteen
days after the entry of judgment. 200 The district court applied the twentyeight-day deadline in F.R.C.P 50(b) and determined that the motion was
timely. 20 1
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and determined that
the fourteen-day deadline in F.R.B.P. 9015(c) was the proper deadline. 202
Therefore, the district court should have denied DVI Entities' motion for
a judgment as a matter of law as untimely. 203 The court reasoned that

191. Rosenberg, 818 F.3d at 1285.
192. 11 U.S.C. § 303(i). This provision allows the court to grant certain costs, fees, and
damages against involuntary petitioners if the court dismisses an involuntary petition under § 303. Id.
193. Rosenberg, 818 F.3d at 1285-86.
194. Id. at 1286. The district court withdrew the reference to the bankruptcy court of
Rosenberg's claims for attorney fees and costs. Id. Those claims remained in bankruptcy
court. Id.
195. Id. at 1287.
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
197. Rosenberg, 818 F.3d at 1286.
198. Id.
199. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9015(c).
200. Rosenberg, 818 F.3d at 1286.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1287.
203. Id.
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"[t]he plain language of the federal rules-of bankruptcy and civil procedure-requires application of the Federal Bankruptcy Rules in this
case." 204 As stated in F.R.B.P.

1001,205

Bankruptcy Rules and forms gov-

ern in cases arising under the Bankruptcy Code. 206 These rules apply to
all courts hearing cases arising under the Bankruptcy Code. 207 The Eleventh Circuit noted that such a "prioritization of the Federal Bankruptcy
Rules reflects the reasonable determination that bankruptcy cases ought
to be tried with a degree of uniformity, regardless of which court may
have heard the matter." 208 Furthermore, the court explained that their
reading of the Bankruptcy and Civil Rules is consistent with. how many
federal courts have addressed the applications of rules in similar circumstances. 209 Therefore, the Bankruptcy Rules apply to and govern in cases
arising under the Bankruptcy Code, including those cases tried in district
court. 210
VIII. CONCLUSION

During the survey period, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit enlarged the divide between the circuit courts on the
issue of stale debt collection and debt collectors' involvement in bankruptcy courts. The court took a minority position and determined that
the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code are not in irreconcilable conflict,
which was an issue that many courts, both circuit and lower, previously
declined to address. The Eleventh Circuit did not side with the minority
on every bankruptcy issue. The court adopted a majority approach to determine whether tax documents were in fact tax returns as they relate to
the dischargeability of tax debts. Similar to last survey period, this survey period was marked by new precedent in developing areas of bankruptcy law. Only time will tell whether court decisions made during the
next survey period will add to the clarity or to the confusion.

204. Id.

205. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.
206. Rosenberg, 818 F.3d at 1287.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1288.

209. Id.
210. Id. at 1292.

